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J85ATANCps UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 ANDREA TANTAROS, 4 Petitioner, 5 19-cv-7131 (ALC) v. 6 FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC, WILLIAM SHINE, THE ESTATE OF ROGER AILES, 7 SUZANNE SCOTT, IRENA BRIGANTI, and DIANE BRANDI, 8 Respondents. Conference 9 10 New York, N.Y. 11 August 5, 2019 1:10 p.m. 12 13 Before: 14 HON.ANDREW L. CARTER, JR. 15 District Judge 16 **APPEARANCES** 17 (via telephone) 18 WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ Attorneys for Petitioner 19 BY: DEMET BASAR, ESQ. DANIEL TEPPER, ESQ. 20 -and-FEIN & DELVALLE, PLLC 21 Attorneys for Petitioner BY: BRUCE FEIN, ESQ. 22 THOMPSON & KNIGHT, LLP Attorneys for Respondent Shine 23 BY: MARION J. BACHRACH, ESQ. 24 EVELYN H. SEELER, ESQ. 25

APPEARANCES (Cont'd) 1 2 JONES DAY Attorneys for Respondents Fox Network LLC, Irena Briganti, Diane Brandi, and Suzanne Scott 3 BY: MATTHEW W. LAMPE, ESQ. 4 KRISTINA A. YOST, ESQ. 5 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN Attorneys for the Estate of Roger Ailes 6 BY: BRENDAN CARROLL, ESQ. KIMBERLY CARSON, ESQ. 7 PETER CALAMARI, ESQ. 8 (Case called) 9 10 THE CLERK: Counsel, please state your appearance for 11 the petitioner. 12 MS. BASAR: Demet Basar and Dan Tepper from Wolf 13 Haldenstein in New York. We've filed our notices of 14 appearance -- good morning -- and filed plaintiff's motion for 15 a remand. We are in the process of preparing --THE CLERK: Hello. Excuse me. I just want to let 16 17 everyone note their appearance first. Thank you. 18 And for the respondent. MR. FEIN: Excuse me. Could I also -- I am Bruce Fein 19 20 for the petitioner Tantaros. I am pro hac vice pending 21 motions. And Ms. Basar will make an oral motion to have me 22 admitted for this conference call. 23 THE CLERK: Thank you. 24 And for the respondents?

MR. LAMPE: This is Matt Lampe of Jones Day, along

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with Kristina Yost of Jones Day. We represent four of the respondents: Fox Network LLC, Irena Briganti, Diane Brandi, and Suzanne Scott.

MR. CARROLL: Hi. Carroll here from Ouinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan. Peter Calamari is on the phone as well. We represent the Estate of Roger Ailes. Kimberly Carson is on the line as well.

MS. BACHRACH: And this is Marion Bachrach from Thompson & Knight representing respondent William Shine, S-h-i-n-e, and Eve Seeler, also on the phone.

THE COURT: OK. Good afternoon, everyone.

So plaintiff's counsel was starting to say something. What is it you were going to say, counsel?

MS. BASAR: Good afternoon, your Honor. Demet Basar here from wolf Haldenstein for petitioner.

This morning, we filed notices of appearance for myself and for my partner, Dan Tepper, who is also on the line. And we also filed a motion for remand on behalf of petitioner Andrea Tantaros. Petitioner is represented by Bruce Fein, who is on the line, who is a member of the D.C. bar. And we are in the process of preparing his pro hac application. And we would like to orally move for Mr. Fein's admission pro hac vice today, so he can formally appear before you.

THE COURT: Any objection to that from defendants, respondents?

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All right. So you are admitted for today's purposes.

Go ahead, counsel. You indicated that you were filing a motion or that you have filed a motion for remand?

> MR. FEIN: Yes.

MS. BASAR: Bruce --

This is Bruce Fein speaking. Yes. MR. FEIN: OK. There was a motion filed based on the theory that three of the four criteria that Chief Justice John Roberts articulated in the Gunn v. Minton case for establishing federal question jurisdiction when the cause of action does not arise under federal law have not been met and the case should be returned to the New York State court.

What is respondents' view on this? THE COURT: OK. What is respondents' view on all of this?

MR. LAMPE: Your Honor, this is Matt Lampe on behalf of the four respondents identified earlier.

We will oppose that motion. Our position is that all four of the prongs outlined in the Gunn case, Grable case, are in fact satisfied here. And this case does raise a serious federal interest. And it's an interest in insuring the uniform and proper application of FAA law. And we will argue in our opposition brief that the case was properly removed under that Gunn/Grable doctrine.

THE COURT: OK. I haven't seen the motion yet. let me just state some of the other concerns that I have and

make sure that these get addressed in the motion and in the responses.

I want to just, first of all, get some things clear to make sure we're all on the same page procedurally. The arbitration has currently been stayed. Is that correct?

MR. FEIN: This is Bruce Fein. Your Honor, it has been stayed de facto. I think the parties have represented to the panel that until this issue of 7515 is decided, either by the New York court or your court, that the panel should refrain from any further rulings.

I'm not sure if it is addressed in the motion to remand -- is, it seems to me that New York courts have not had an opportunity yet to decide in the first instance whether or not CPLR 7515 runs retroactively. Am I correct there? Has the court made a ruling on that, to counsel's understanding, at this point? From either side?

MR. FEIN: This again is Bruce Fein, speaking for the petitioner. We could not find anything with regard to a state court decision. There was a federal court decision that's referenced in the papers, the *Lati* case, that was decided in the Southern District of New York. But that court decision does not address the retroactivity issue that you have flagged. It simply jumped over it, and is a decision based upon a different theory.

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THE COURT: It seems to me that one thing that the parties should address is whether or not I have jurisdiction to here these arguments and whether or not there are some arguments that I have jurisdiction to hear and others that I don't, and whether or not, even if I have jurisdiction, I should abstain from exercising that jurisdiction. particular, it seems to me that there is an argument, there is an issue regarding whether or not this statute runs retroactively. It seems to me from the face of the petition and the removal petition as well as the underlying complaint that the contracts were entered into well in advance of the amendment to CPLR 7515. It seems to me that New York State should be the ones to decide whether or not that runs retroactively and that I should not be deciding that issue. And I'd like the parties to address that in their motions, as to whether or not I should be addressing that issue at all.

It does seem to me that if New York had determined, although that's not the case, if New York had determined that this statute did not run retroactively, then it would seem to me that there would be a stronger argument that I don't have any jurisdiction over this matter. There would be no need at all for me to get into issues of the FAA and whether or not that preempts the CPLR provision. But let me get counsel's initial thoughts on that if you have any. But it does seem to me that that's something that should be addressed. Let me hear

from plaintiff on that briefly.

MR. FEIN: Your Honor, the notice of removal makes no allusion — I mean, it doesn't raise that issue as something that should be decided by the federal court. It simply rests completely on interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act as preempting 7515. As a consequence, in the motion to remand that we have filed, we did raise issues that weren't raised specifically in the notice of removal. But we're certainly prepared to file a supplemental memorandum of law that addresses that particular issue. But we adopt what the notice of removal stated as its justification.

THE COURT: OK. Let me hear from the defendants on this.

MR. LAMPE: Your Honor, Matt Lampe. Our position is that the statute does not apply to the contract at issue here. However, based on the face of the petition as it was filed, the petition does raise the substantial federal question of whether or not the CPLR 7515 is preempted by the FAA. On that basis we removed. If the Court denies the motion to remand and determines that it has jurisdiction over the case, we would expect that the next thing for the Court to decide is a motion to dismiss. Certainly in that motion to dismiss we would assert preemption. We would also assert other defenses that are available on the face of the complaint. One of them would be that the statute does not apply retroactively here. I could

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understand the Court not deciding the second question depending on how it decides the first question. But on the face of the petition as it was filed, the basis for removal that we have invoked in our removal petition is valid.

MR. FEIN: Your Honor, Mr. Fein again responding. I don't think that makes much sense. The fact is, the first issue that they're saying that they want to press is whether the statute 7515 is retroactive. If it's not retroactive, then the Federal Arbitration Act doesn't enter into the equation at all. So it couldn't possibly be an argument that is addressing federal law, simply that the New York law doesn't apply here. That isn't a federal question. That's interpretation of state law. So they can't have it both ways, stating on one hand they want state law to control for purposes of the merits and on the other hand for jurisdictional purposes you are to blind yourself to the state law and jump to the Federal Arbitration Act, which doesn't come into play until you've decided the retroactivity.

THE COURT: OK. Let's just do this. Let me just find out, I haven't had a chance to look at the motion to remand. It sounds as if the plaintiffs did not specifically deal with this issue in the motion to remand. Is that correct?

MR. FEIN: That's correct, because it wasn't raised in the notice of removal.

THE COURT: OK. It seems to me that it certainly

might be something that's necessary for me to at least think about, in terms of whether or not I have jurisdiction. It seems to me that that's a component of me determining whether or not I have jurisdiction as to how substantial the federal issue is, how necessary it is. Obviously "necessary" under federal law doesn't mean it's absolutely positively necessary, but it does seem to me that it's something that I should be considering. And it certainly is something that seems relevant to any notions of abstention, if that's appropriate in this case, as well.

So let me go ahead and give the plaintiffs an opportunity to supplement their motion to remand and deal with that issue, and let's go ahead and set a schedule for the defendants to oppose the motion to remand, if that makes sense procedurally. Does that make sense to everyone procedurally?

MR. FEIN: It does for the petitioner, your Honor.

MR. LAMPE: For respondents, your Honor, that makes sense. On the answer date we have a deadline of August 19.

Assuming that the purpose has been effectuated, our deadline for answering and/or moving to dismiss, which I understand under your Honor's individual practice would be a pre-motion letter, but that deadline is the 19th of August. So your Honor may give us some guidance whether or not that deadline will be stayed or, if not, whether we should just, simultaneously with this motion to remand briefing, submit our pre-motion letter

related to the forthcoming motion to dismiss on the deadline.

THE COURT: It seems to me to make sense to stay any deadline to answer or file any motion to dismiss. I first need to deal with the issue of jurisdiction. But let's go ahead and give some deadlines. Let's have the plaintiffs/petitioners file their supplemental brief by, let's get that in in a week. Is that enough time for counsel?

MR. FEIN: Yes. This is Mr. Fein for the petitioner. Yes, we will call this a supplemental memorandum of law in support of the motion to dismiss. And we'll file that August 12th.

THE COURT: All right. So let's get that supplemental memo of law regarding the motion to remand August 12th. Let's have the respondents respond to that by September the 3rd. And if there is a need for a reply, then let's have a date for the reply of September the 6th.

It also seems to me procedurally that it -- well, I'm not sure it makes any sense for me to issue any orders staying arbitration until I'm certain that I have jurisdiction over this matter. And since the arbitration has been stayed de facto, perhaps that's just totally a moot point. Do counsel have any thoughts on that?

MR. FEIN: This is Mr. Fein. I think until you establish subject matter jurisdiction, the better course of action is to refrain from issuing any ruling. That comes

first. And I'm confident that, with the consensus of all respondents and petitioners, that the panel should refrain — and the panel has not indicated that it's going to ignore a consensus — that it's superfluous for you to issue any order right now on the panel.

THE COURT: OK. Anything from respondents on this?

MR. LAMPE: This is Matt Lampe. I agree with

Mr. Fein's assessment.

THE COURT: All right. So we have those deadlines.

Let me just ask a question regarding efficiency here. How far has the arbitration progressed at this point? I understand at this point there are some issues regarding discovery. But is the arbitration, or was it, close to being finished?

MR. LAMPE: Your Honor, this is Matt Lampe for the respondents, for the four respondents. The arbitration has been pending for three years. After this CPLR 7515 statute went into effect, the petitioner Tantaros continued to prosecute her claims in that arbitration, seeking relief from the arbitration panel and obtaining some relief from that arbitration panel. The respondent also sought and obtained relief from that arbitration panel. There is suggestion in plaintiff's petition there has been delay on the responsibility of respondent. Our position is exactly the opposite, that the delay is on the account of Ms. Tantaros's refusal to participate in discovery. So what's currently in the

arbitration right now is respondents' motion to dismiss

Ms. Tantaros' claims because of failure to participate in the discovery process. And the day that we filed our reply in support of that motion to dismiss was the day that Ms. Tantaros filed her petition in state court. A year after the statute went into effect, to all of a sudden determine that she was no longer required, in fact respondents were prohibited from litigating the matter in an arbitration process — so to answer your question succinctly, the arbitration has been pending for a very long time. It has not gotten very far. There is a dispute as to whose fault that is.

MR. FEIN: Yes. Obviously -- this is Mr. Fein speaking for the petitioner -- we would ask for an assessment of what transpired before the panel. But I don't think this is the occasion to raise it, I think is the bottom line, since the panel is not close, I think, to coming to any final judgment on the merits.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. BACHRACH: If I may, your Honor, this is Marion
Bachrach for William Shine. I just think there's one more
point of which the Court should be aware on the question of
efficiency, as the Court has asked, which is that one reason
for the delay is that Ms. Tantaros has had now seven different
lawyers. With the appearance of new counsel on this matter
today, that would be eight counsel. So that is the occasion

for much delay, with going through all those different counsel.

THE COURT: OK. Let's do this, if counsel are OK with this. Let's just go off the record for a second. Let's have a quick conversation about potential settling of this case, if that's OK. Are counsel all right with that?

MR. FEIN: Yes. Mr. Fein.

MR. LAMPE: Yes, as long as we go back on the record, because we would like the Court to give us a specific deadline for the date to respond to the petition or answer or motion to dismiss so that there's no argument that we're in default when the 19th of August comes and goes.

THE COURT: All right. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion held off the record)

THE COURT: All right. Let's go back on the record then.

OK. We're back on the record. We had an off-the-record discussion about trying to resolve these issues efficiently. I have encourage counsel to continue to think about that.

Let me go ahead and give the respondent a date to respond. It has indicated a desire to file a motion to dismiss. And let me get a sense again from counsel as to what the nature of this motion to dismiss would be.

MR. LAMPE: Your Honor -- this is Matt Lampe -- the first argument would be that the statute is preempted. Whether

we have additional arguments or not we have not thoroughly thought through. But the motion would be that the Court should dismiss the petition because on its face it's clear that the statute is exempted by federal law.

THE COURT: OK. Well, hold on a second. What we have here is we have the petition. The removal petition is seeking a declaratory judgment. And we have a motion to remand that has been filed by the plaintiff. So I'll need to decide this motion to remand. If the case is not remanded, I'm not sure if it's more efficient to have the respondents file a motion to dismiss or simply to file your motion for declaratory judgment and have the opposing motion for declaratory judgment filed by the plaintiff. It seems to me that maybe that makes more sense than having a motion to dismiss the underlying complaint, if we're here now in federal court on the removal petition. But let me hear from the respondents on that.

MR. LAMPE: This Matt Lampe. I think that would be fine. There is a legal issue to present, which is the preemption issue. From our perspective, it's presented appropriately on the motion to dismiss. If your Honor prefers that the parties brief it on cross-motions for declaratory judgment, I am not thinking of any reason why that would not also be perfectly appropriate. I think either way our position would be the Court should decide that preemption issue and can do so very quickly as soon as the jurisdictional question is

determined.

THE COURT: OK. And let me just find out from respondents, was there something else you had planned on including in a motion to dismiss besides the preemption issue?

MR. LAMPE: No, your Honor. There are other arguments that we may consider including, one of which is the retroactivity argument. So we could say the statute is preempted. If you find that it is not preempted, then you could find that it is not applicable to this case. And there could be other arguments as well.

But the issue, petitioner, on the face of petition, raises really just one issue, and that is, is the statute preempted or not. And petitioner sought in state court declaratory judgment that there is no preemption. Our view is that the federal court should decide their issue under the doctrine that we invoked in our removal petition. So that may be raised in a motion to dismiss once the Court determines that it has jurisdiction. But if the Court determines that it has federal question jurisdiction, that's not to say that we can only raise federal questions before the federal court. obviously there would be other questions that could be raised, of course, if the Court has question jurisdiction.

THE COURT: OK. Plaintiffs, any thoughts on this?

MR. FEIN: Yes. This is Mr. Fein speaking for the plaintiff. The respondents, they tried to have it both ways.

They're trying to say, OK, this is a federal question case, but argue on state law retroactivity as well. And that would moot any federal question, if you decided that it was not retroactive, so the prohibition didn't come into play at all. And generally speaking, in regard to constitutional cases, you try addressing a federal question if you can decide it on state law issues. And here, there's no injunctive federal issue first, and if you lose there, then you have the state law issue that may belong to the federal issue. That fails. I just don't see how that works. If they lose on the federal issue, I don't think you have the jurisdiction to consider the retroactivity issue. You no longer have subject matter jurisdiction.

And separately I believe that, as a matter of discretion, you would send the state law issue back to state court.

MS. BACHRACH: Your Honor, this is Marion Bachrach for Mr. Shine. I did brief the retroactivity issue as purely a state law issue.

THE COURT: Hold on a second. Counsel, hold on a second.

(Pause)

MS. BACHRACH: Good to go?

THE COURT: Hold on a second because sometimes they do this twice. Just wait a second.

OK. Go ahead, counsel.

MS. BACHRACH: Thank you. What I was saying is that I disagree that the issue regarding retroactivity is purely a state law issue. It certainly can be part of the motion to dismiss. It's a very strong issue with respect to, the face of the statute alleges less history, but there is very important federal Supreme Court law, and recent Supreme Court law, that plaintiff, Ms. Tantaros, has quoted, and that clearly is germane to the retroactivity, or I should say nonretroactive issue. So it's not purely a state court issue at all.

MR. FEIN: Your Honor, this is Mr. Fein again. I simply part company. I don't see how anything that has been said shows that whether 7515 is retroactive implicates the United States Constitution or the Federal Arbitration Act. The Federal Arbitration Act doesn't say anything at all about whether a statute is retroactive or not. It's purely interpretation of state law. If you were to decide 7515 applies retroactively, you would look exclusively at state law, because that governs. If it's retroactive, it may have consequences. But the issue of retroactivity in isolation is a purely state law issue.

THE COURT: OK. Let's do this.

MS. BACHRACH: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Hold on. I'm not going to make this decision now. I was trying to get a sense of where we were in

terms of efficiency, getting everything teed up for me to decide. So let's do this. We have a motion schedule for the motion to remand and an opposition for the motion to remand as well as a reply schedule. Let's set a conference date, because I do need to deal with the issue of jurisdiction first. Let's set a conference date for September 19th. Does that work for everyone? At 11 o'clock?

MS. BACHRACH: No, I'm not --

THE COURT: I can't hear you, counsel.

MR. FEIN: Your Honor.

MR. LAMPE: Your Honor, this is Matt Lampe. That date works for 11 o'clock in the morning.

MS. BACHRACH: Your Honor, this is Marion Bachrach.

It doesn't work for me. I teach a course on Thursday. I can't do that. I apologize.

THE COURT: All right. How about Monday, September 23rd, at 11 o'clock?

MR. LAMPE: This is Matt Lampe. That works for the four respondents that we represent.

MR. FEIN: Your Honor, this is Bruce Fein. I have an oral argument in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. You know, they have the case there. I haven't been told whether it's the first case or not. They have oral argument from 9 to noontime. That morning, then, is foreclosed. I could do it any time in the afternoon.

1 THE COURT: All right. Hold on a second. 2 How about October the 2nd, then? That's a Wednesday. At 2 o'clock p.m. 3 4 MR. LAMPE: That is Matt Lampe for respondent. That 5 works for us. 6 MR. FEIN: Bruce Fein for the petitioner. That works 7 for me. Yes. MS. BACHRACH: Marion Bachrach. That works for me. 8 9 What was the time, your Honor? 10 THE COURT: 2 o'clock. 11 MS. BACHRACH: Thank you very much. 12 MR. CARROLL: And from Quinn Emanuel, on behalf of the 13 Estate of Roger Ailes, that works for us as well. 14 THE COURT: All right. So we will have a status conference at 2 o'clock. I hope to have a decision regarding 15 jurisdiction by then. And at that point we will deal with 16 17 setting a schedule if necessary for a motion to dismiss or a 18 motion for declaratory judgment. But I do need to deal with 19 the issue of jurisdiction first. So we'll again stay any 20 motion to dismiss or any answer until that date. We'll deal 21 with it on that date. 22 Anything else from plaintiff today? 23 MR. FEIN: No, your Honor. Thank you.

MR. LAMPE: That is Matt Lampe. Not for the four

Anything else from defendants today?

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THE COURT:

respondents that we represent. MS. BASAR: Your Honor. I apologize. This is Demet Basar from Wolf Haldenstein for plaintiff. It's not clear to us whether your Honor wants an in-person conference or a telephonic conference. THE COURT: Let's do that one in person. MS. BASAR: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Anything else from the other defendants? OK. We're adjourned. COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor. (Adjourned)